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Simple growth accounting shows that the negative scale effect of economic growth on the 
environment can be compensated by a composition effect, increasing the weight of less 
polluting productions, and by a technical progress favorable to the environment, in order to 
make possible a sustainable growth path. To achieve this result a combination of 
environmental regulation and innovation policy is required. Revenues from economic 
instruments of environmental regulation can be earmarked to environmental friendly 
innovations; difficulties arise because of the trade off with using those revenues as 
redistributive means to compensate the usually regressive nature of environmental regulation. 
The “case study” of the energy and climate program of President Obama is an example of the 
complexity of the challenge to move towards the target of a “green economy”. A 
complementary essential role of social environmental responsibility both of consumers and 
firms is required. 
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provisional character. Greening the economy: pessimists versus optimists 
 
It is a debated question whether or not “greening” the recovery programs 
designed to overcome the global economic crisis is  an appropriate and 
convenient strategy. Some believe that the economic recovery should not be 
constrained by any concern for the environment; environmental problems should 
be left totally aside and only taken in consideration once the economy had started 
growing again. Others believe the opposite: directing the economy recovery 
along “greener” guidelines will not only help the recovery itself to be successful, 
but it will also achieve the long run objective of promoting a model of 
sustainable economic development, a model of economic growth compatible 
with preserving and possibly improving the environmental quality. 
 
This second vision seems more convincing. The first one considers the 
environmental quality as a luxury good, ignoring the existence of  structural 
environmental problems threatening the sustainability of the economy and of the 
society in the long run. 
 
However the target implied by the second vision should not be considered as 
something that will be automatically realized, but as an opportunity that must be 
pursued with appropriate policies. The risk must be avoided of wishful 
declarations, not followed by any concrete initiative. 
 
In what follows I will try to show that “Greening the economy”, which is a 
different way of expressing the objective of achieving a model of sustainable 
economic development, requires a set of strong interactive and complementary 
conditions, not easily realized: environmental regulation, environmental 
innovation policy and environmental responsibility of consumers and firms.   
 
 
Some accounting on the relation between environment and economic growth 
 
Sustainable economic growth requires a balance between the environmental 
impact of the economic growth and the assimilative capacity of the environment. 
An index of the environmental impact are polluting emissions, e.g. emissions of 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the case of the problem of climate change. 
 
If the environmental quality has achieved an acceptable level which must at least 
be maintained, the flow of polluting emissions in the environment should remain 
within the assimilative capacity. If the environmental quality must be improved, 
the flow of polluting emissions must decline over time. In the case of the climate 
change, it is clear that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere should be 
reduced; hence the flow of emissions of CO2 at the world level must decline over 
time.       2
 
The pressure of economic activity on the environment depends on three factors 
(Brock and Taylor, 2005): a) growth of the scale of the economic system (scale 
effect); b) changes in the productive structure (composition effect); c) how 
technological development affects the impact of the economic activities on the 
environment (technique effect). 
 
The scale of the economy grows because of population growth and of growth in 
output per capita. The effect of these factors on the environment, when they are 
considered alone, is negative: hence the scale effect is negative. 
 
The negative scale effect may be compensated or more than compensated by a 
reduction in the average aggregate coefficient of environmental impact per unit 
of GDP. If this coefficient declines at a rate greater than the rate at which GDP 
grows, the environmental impact declines. In the case of climate change, the 
emission flow of CO2 must decline over time: this requires that the average 
coefficient of emissions per unit of output declines at a rate higher that the rate of 
GDP growth.  
 
The dynamics of the aggregate coefficient of emissions per unit of GDP depends 
on two factors: a) the economic structure; b) the dynamics of the coefficients of 
emissions per unit of output in each productive sector. 
The higher is the weight of the sectors whose emission coefficient per unit of 
output is declining faster, the more rapidly will the aggregate emission 
coefficient per unit of GDP decline, and the higher is the likelihood that the 
composition and technique effect overcome the scale effect. 
 
Changes in the productive structure basically depend on the evolution of the final 
demand composition: hence a positive effect of the dynamics of aggregate 
emissions will come from an evolution of the consumption pattern towards goods 
whose production and consumption entails lower emission coefficients (positive 
composition effect). 
 
The dynamics of emission coefficients in the individual sectors reflects the 
dynamics of technological progress in each sector. A positive effect is expected 
to come from a technological progress reducing these emission coefficients. 
However, technological progress also increases labor productivity. This increases 
output per capita and hence contributes to the negative scale effect. Thus, there is 
an intrinsic ambiguity in the role of technological progress for a sustainable 
economic growth. 
 
A technological progress “good” with respect to sustainability shows up as 
reduction of emission coefficients per unit of output in individual sectors;  a 
technological progress “bad” with respect to sustainability shows up in labor  3
productivity growth. The net “technique” effect will be positive for sustainable 
economic growth if the “good” type of technological progress prevails over the 
“bad” type. The optimal situation would be to have an elasticity of the emission 
coefficient per unit of output with respect to the output per capita higher than one 
in absolute value. 
 
The interaction between different factors affecting the dynamics of the emission 
flow turns out to be very complex; various configurations in the relation between 
environment and economic growth can emerge from this interaction. It is not 
automatic that the prevailing one is that which allows a combination of a positive 
composition and technique effects larger than a negative scale effect. The 
spontaneous market behavior is not sufficient; policies are required. 
 
 
Environmental regulation and environmental innovation 
 
Environmental regulation plays an important role in achieving a sustainable 
economic growth. Even the optimistic vision expressed by the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (Borghesi and Vercelli, 2008) recognizes the importance of the 
role of environmental regulation in affecting the moment where the curve will 
start declining. 
 
By increasing the price of the emissions, according to their marginal social 
damage, the economic environmental regulation provides an incentive to adjust 
the way economic agents behave in a direction more favorable to the 
environment. Consumers’ demand should shift to more environmental friendly 
products. Firms should modify their productive processes and products towards 
features reducing emissions per unit of output. Hence the economic 
environmental regulation is expected to favor: a) a positive composition effect; b) 
a positive net technique effect. 
 
The positive effect of the economic environmental regulation acts through the 
price effect and what we can called “the Porter effect”. According to the price 
effect, if  polluting emissions are considered as a productive input; a higher price 
of this input, determined by an economic environmental regulation, is an 
incentive towards an “induced innovation” (Hicks, 1932) saving this input. 
According to the “Porter effect” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) environmental 
rules induce firms to adjust their strategy so as to discover new opportunities for 
efficiency and profit perspectives’ improvement offered by environmental 
protection. 
 
However it is not always the case that the environmental regulation succeeds in 
stimulating environmental friendly innovations in the productive processes and in 
the outputs’ features. Often the effect of the environmental regulation is simply  4
to increase expenditures in emission abatement, aiming at reducing end-of pipe 
emissions, without affecting the nature of productive processes and outputs.  
 
In order to induce an environment oriented innovation, the environmental 
regulation should be able to move firms to a longer run strategy. Environmental 
regulation should be consistent and persistent over time in order to send the 
appropriate signals inducing firms to innovate: in other words, firms should be 
convinced that it is in their interest to undertake environmental innovations in 
order to reduce the higher expected costs of a  future stricter regulation.        
 
Very important is the diffusion of the environmental regulation at an 
international scale. This process widens the market for new environmental 
technologies, not only for production technologies but also for products using 
those technologies and thereby reducing the environmental impact of their 
consumption. This market effect is very important in convincing firms to 
undertake environment friendly innovations. 
 
The literature agrees in recognizing that an economic environmental regulation 
(either as emission taxes or as tradable emission permits) is successful in 
inducing the adoption of environment friendly existing technologies (Newell, 
Jaffe and Stavins, 2006; Popp, Newell and Jaffe, 2009). But what about the effect 
on research for the discovering of new technologies?  
 
An important distinction is between “incremental” and “radical” innovations. 
The first are innovations within an existing technological regime; the second 
modify the existing technological regime. Radical innovations require relevant 
investments in research and their market success is more uncertain. 
 
In the energy field, incremental innovations are those improving energy 
efficiency of the existing fossil fuels, whilst radical innovations develop 
alternative technologies to those based upon fossil fuels. The second requires 
higher investments, of longer duration, with riskier market perspectives. 
 
 
Combining environmental and innovation policies 
 
The thesis prevailing in the literature is that environmental regulation is 
successful in promoting incremental innovations, but not successful enough in 
promoting radical innovations. This is not surprising as radical environmental 
innovations are characterized by very high market risks, so that firms are very 
careful in undertaking them. The message is that for promoting radical 
environmental innovations, environmental regulation should be integrated with a 
specific policy for the promotion of the required technological innovation. 
  5
Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) were among the first to show that economic 
instruments of environmental policy should be associated to the traditional 
instruments of industrial policy to achieve an optimal level of emission 
reduction. Later, similar results have been obtained for the more specific problem 
of promoting technological innovation to reduce CO2 emissions to mitigate the 
climate change (Gillligham, Newell and Pizer, 2006; Popp, 2006; Otto, Loescher 
and Reilly, 2006; Popp, Newell and Jaffe, 2009). 
 
This same type of result has been obtained within models of endogenous 
technological progress. Using a Romer type model of endogenous technical 
progress, Van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) show that an energy tax recycled as a 
subsidy to research increases the long rate of endogenous growth. Gerlagh, 
Kverndokk and Rosendal (2009) obtain the same result within a model with 
expanding variety endogenous technical progress. Grimaud and Rouge (2008) 
confirm this result in a model of endogenous growth using the concept of 
“directed technological change” introduced by Acemoglu (2002).  
  
Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2009) use a production function, 
formerly used by Sue Wing (2006), where a final output is produced by two 
intermediate inputs, one “clean” and the other “dirty”, each obtained by machines 
and labor. The “clean” sector uses machines whose operation is not damaging the 
environment , the “dirty” sector uses machines whose operation is negative for 
the environment. The two intermediate inputs can be substituted in producing the 
final output, with a constant elasticity of substitution. This elasticity of 
substitution is assumed to be sufficiently high. 
 
Innovation is machine quality improving. The present state of technology is 
represented by the average productivity of the existing machines: it reflects the 
past accumulated innovations, and these are assumed to be higher in the dirty 
sector because in this sector the innovations have been accumulated over a longer 
time period than in the clean sector, where they are more recent. 
 
The incentive to innovate is higher where the average productivity of machines is 
higher, hence in the dirty sector. According to the approach of directed 
technological change, the innovation is also directed where the market is wider. 
This market effect is determined by the ratio between average sectoral 
productivities and by the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate 
inputs. The higher is the elasticity of substitution, the more the innovation is 
favored in the sector whose relative average productivity is higher, hence in the 
dirty sector. 
 
The price of the intermediate input produced with more productive machines (the 
dirty one) will be relatively lower. As a price effect favors innovation in the 
sector where the relative price is higher, this means that the price effect will favor  6
innovation in the clean sector. Only when the elasticity of substitution is low 
enough, the price effect dominates and clean innovation is favored. The 
implication of assuming an elasticity of substitution sufficiently high is that the 
market forces are likely to promote innovations in the dirty sector, and policies 
are required to correct this trend.  
 
An environmental policy is required. For example in the climate change problem, 
a “carbon tax” discouraging dirty innovation and production is recommended. 
However, in order to avoid an excessive use of “carbon tax” which would 
eventually discourage production and growth, an optimal policy involves both 
“carbon taxes” and research subsidies. In other words, environmental regulation 
acts through reducing the production of the polluting intermediate input; to 
promote innovation in the clean sector, a specific innovation policy is needed to 
increase the ratio between the productivity level in the clean sector relatively to 
the dirty sector.  
 
Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2009) also show that  implementing 
and combining the two policies only in advanced economies is not enough in an 
international framework where technologies developed in advanced economies 
can be imitated and transferred to developing economies. This is due to a 
“pollution haven” effect (Copeland and Scott Taylor, 2003; Di Maria and 
Smulders, 2004) which induces the delocalization of dirty activities in 
developing countries without an environmental regulation in these countries.   
 
The existing literature agrees in suggesting the need of linking environmental 
regulation to an environmental innovation policy. One way to do it is to use the 
revenues from the economic instruments of the environmental regulation to 
finance, at least partly, the innovation policy: in the direct form of promoting an 
environmentally oriented public expenditure, or in the indirect form of 
subsidizing the environmental research of private firms. This possibility is 
immediately seen if emission taxes are used; in the case of tradable emission 
permits, they should initially auctioned in order to provide a revenue to the 
auctioning authority.  
 
However, using the revenues from the economic instruments of environmental 
regulation to sustain a public policy of environmental innovation is not easy. 
There is trade off between this type of utilization of the revenue and an 
alternative one, consisting in using the revenue to compensate those who are 
more heavily hit by a typically regressive type of fiscal policy as that represented 
by the economic instruments of environmental regulation. 
 
Using the revenues of the economic instruments of environmental regulation for 
redistributive policies is highly demanded in any society. The problem is how to 
implement these redistributive policies in a way that does not neutralize the  7
environmental direction of the economic agents’ choices induced by the 
environmental regulation. 
 
But even if this is the case, a trade off remains between the two ways to utilize 
the revenues from the economic instruments of environmental policy: 
redistribution and incentive to innovation. 
 
                      
The program of President Obama: an attempt in the right direction 
 
An interesting attempt to integrate environmental regulation and environmental 
innovation policy is represented by the program of President Obama on energy 
and environment included in the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
(ACES), which was approved at the end of June 2009 by the US House of 
Representatives with a small majority of seven votes.  
 
A debate on an energy and climate change act is currently taking place in the US 
Senate; as it may end out to be different from the act approved in the House of 
Representative, I will concentrate on this one. 
 
A first objective of the ACES act is to increase the energy efficiency of the 
American system and to promote structural changes in the energy demand. The 
primary energy requirements should be reduced by 7% in 2020 and by 12% in 
2050; according to the Environment Protection Agency (EPA, 2009), the share of 
primary energy of the “low or zero-carbon type” will increase to 18% in 2020 
and to 38% in 2050 with respect to the “Business as Usual” share of 14%.      
 
A second related objective of the ACES act is to reduce within 2020 the flow of 
CO2 emissions by 17% with respect to the 2005 level; within 2050 these 
emissions should be 83% lower than those in 2005. 
 
The main economic instrument to achieve this objective is a system of tradable 
emission permits of the “cap and trade” type. 85% of these permits will be 
initially distributed freely to firms, and the remaining 15% will be auctioned. The 
share of auctioned permits will increase up to 70% in 2030. 
 
The method used in the initial allocation of permits does not modify the 
environmental effects of the instrument: polluting firms are facing the same 
emission costs in both cases, auctioned or free initial allocation; hence their 
decisions on how to reduce emissions do not depend on the method of initial 
allocation. 
 
Where the difference between methods of allocation is important lies in the 
possibility of undertaking related policies. A low amount of auctioned permits  8
will not provide sufficient revenues to be used either as a tool of redistributive 
policy to compensate those negatively affected by higher energy costs, or to 
support policies for environmental innovation. 
 
The ACES act is definitely concerned with the redistributive issue. Robert 
Stavins  suggests that the best way to assess the implication of the bill is not by 
opposing “free allocation” to “auction”, but by founding “the ultimate 
beneficiary of each element of the allocation and auction, that is, how the value 
of the allowances is allocated”. He finds that over the entire period from 2012 to 
2050 consumers and public purposes will benefit for 80%, while private industry 
will benefit for 20% (Stavins, 2009a).  
 
Compensating households for the regressive effects of an increase in energy 
prices is a difficult task. Permits allocated freely to local utilities for distributing 
electric energy and gas will be given under the constraint that households’ wealth 
is in someway protected from the effect of higher energy prices. As noted before, 
the way this compensation will take place should discourage energy demand. 
Hence it should not take place through a tariff reduction, but through lump sum 
transfers of rebates, which will not affect the incentives which higher relative 
energy prices represent towards energy saving and efficiency. 
 
In the bill, the allocation of permits to firms is also oriented to promote a gradual 
development of new technologies with a lower energy impact and using 
renewable energy sources. 
 
The contribution of US to the global climate change problem must be a joint 
contribution with the largest possible number of other countries of the world. As 
in any typical public good problem, each potential contributor to the provision of 
the global public good represented by climate improvement fears the risk of 
being excessively damaged by the “free riding” behavior of the others potential 
contributions. The US fear that any unilateral action to reduce  CO2 emissions  
could damage the competitiveness of the industrial American system with respect 
to other “big emitters” such as China and India, that could not undertake similar 
measures. 
 
This concern is reflected in two points of ACES act. The first one is found at the 
beginning of the text, where “international participation” is being defined: it 
prescribes that the Environmental Protection Agency must  yearly report to the 
Congress on whether or not China and India have adopted CO2 emission 
reduction standards similar to those adopted in the ACES act. If this is not the 
case, EPA is required not only to inform the Congress, but to inform the public 
opinion through an appropriate use of the “media”.  
  9
The second point concerns the measure of assigning a share of the freely 
allocated emission permits to some energy intensive sectors highly sensible to 
international trade (aluminum, cement, iron and steel). This subsidy to polluting 
production is justified as a measure to preserve international competitiveness, by 
avoiding “carbon leakage”, which shifts comparative advantage of producing 
carbon-intensive goods in the direction of countries not imposing the same cost 
on the production of those goods as imposed in US. This measure is combined 
with the parallel measure of associating emission permits to the imports of 
carbon-intensive goods from countries not undertaking climate policies of the 
same type of the American policies.  
 
As noted by Stavins (2009b) it is questionable whether such a measure, which 
corresponds to a “border tax”, will succeed as an incentive for developing 
countries with high CO2 emissions to impose domestic costs on those emissions 
in order to avoid the border tax. Stavins observes that China only exports 3% of 
its cement production and he rightly doubts that China would be willing to 
increase the domestic cost of producing almost the whole cement to protect less 
than 3% of its production. 
 
The ACES act clearly shows that the US are prepared to undertake domestic 
measures to mitigate CO2 emissions, but that they would make these decisions 
conditional to similar policies by other “big emitters”. The circular problem 
emerging from such an attitude is well known in the theory on international 
environmental agreements (Barrett, 2003): the US constrain their strategy in 
favor of climate change mitigation to a cooperative answer by “big emitters” like 
China, India and other large emerging developing countries; but the probability 
that these countries accept to join a cooperative mitigation policy depends on the 
credibility of the position of the US.  
 
Considered in this perspective, the Copenhagen Agreement, although it appears 
rather general and unfortunately lacking some more precise quantitative emission 
reduction commitments, can be seen as a first step forward in the direction of 
building a more cooperative strategy involving both types of “big emitters”, 
advanced economies such as US and EU, and developing emerging economies 
such China and India. It is important that the agreement was initially proposed 
and signed by US, China, Brazil and South Africa; as it is important that the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” was recognized, so that 
each nation, including the rapidly growing developing countries which are parts 
of the so-called Non-Annex I countries according to the Kyoto Protocol 
terminology, accepts a commitment to a domestic climate policies which will be 
assessed through some kind of international consultation and analysis.     
 
If the US could succeed in having a law (passed also by the Senate) committing 
the country to a consistent strategy not only to address the domestic energy  10
challenge, but also the way the US economy could contribute to the global 
climate change problem, this would be a further step towards the conditions 
required to build an effective international post-Kyoto agreement. The US 
(together with the EU) would give an example to emerging rapidly developing 
countries, and they would be more credible in requiring these countries to 
undertake similar mitigation actions.                         
 
 
Environmental social responsibility: an additional pillar for a green 
economy 
 
Although the distributive concern seems to be prevailing over the need of 
devoting sufficient resources to an environmental innovation policy, the ACES 
act is an important step towards the integration of environmental regulation with 
an environmental innovation policy.  
 
But it is also an example of how difficult this integration is; moreover it shows 
that such an integration may not be sufficient for building a green economy. The 
lacking condition is a widespread environmental responsibility of consumers and 
firms.  
 
Environmentally responsible choices of consumers are the result of a greater 
environmental awareness of consumers which may derive both from moral 
factors, giving an existence value to the preservation of the environment and of 
the nature, and from the perception of the health risks associated to 
environmental deterioration.  
 
Environmentally responsible choices of consumers may help regulation in 
sustaining demand and creating a wider market for environment friendly goods. 
If consumers show a bigger willingness to pay for cleaner products and processes 
relatively to dirty ones, this gives firms a clear market signal which reinforces the 
signal coming from environmental regulation. 
 
Environmental responsibility of firms may also derive both from moral factors 
included in the ethical firm’s codes and from a stronger pressure of the different 
stakeholders including a “watchdog effect” from the public opinion. Bad 
reputation and potential liability actions are among the most important drivers of 
voluntary strategies undertaken by firms to improve their environmental 
performance.  
 
There are signs that the practical environmental performance of firms does not 
always confirm the traditional idea that “businesses…(should) behave in an 
unprincipled fashion to make money”. “Principled  behavior and profitable 
behavior” are not necessarily in conflict (Heal, 2008). There is increasing  11
evidence that the environmental responsibility of firms is paying in terms of 
market success (Esty and Winston, 2006; Makower, 2009).    
 
A widespread culture of environmental responsibility in the society supports a 
consensus for public choices in the direction of a sustainable economic growth: it 
makes environmental regulation more likely to be approved and implemented, 
and at the same time allows it to be less invasive.       
 
I conclude that a complementary relation exists between environmental 
regulation, environmental innovation policy and environmental social 
responsibility: these are the three pillars supporting the hope for the building of a 
green economy. Making them work together is not an easy task, but being aware 
of the complexity of their interaction and of the factors required for their synergy 
to be successful is a necessary condition to avoid that “greening the economy” 
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